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The Physical Externality Model is used to illustrate the potential limitations of blindly 
adopting formal models for economic investigation and explanation in varied 
geographical contexts. As argued by institutional economists for the last hundred 
years the practice limits the value and relevance of most general economic inquiry. 
This model postulates that the geographical location of farmers along a given 
watercourse, in which water is diverted individually, leads to structural inefficiencies 
that negatively affect the whole farming community. These effects are felt more 
severely at downstream sites and lead to a status quo where upstream farmers possess 
relative economic and political advantages over their counterparts elsewhere. In the 
study of the Kat River basin these predictions appear to be true only in as far as they 
relate to legal and political allocations and use of water resources. In terms of lawful 
uses of land resources aimed at expanding citrus production, the model’s predictions 
are not met. The status quo is however fully explained by the implications of having 
adopted formal water scheduling rights by upstream farmers as well as other 
geographical factors. Hence, the case for investigating the effects of important 
institutions within general economic research is strengthened.  
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1.   Introduction and orientation 
 
Ronald Coase (1998) reflected on the direction the discipline of economics has 
taken since Adam Smith as having become the study of blood circulation 
without a body. “What this comes down to is that economists think of 
themselves as having a box of tools, but not the subject matter.” Many 
economists, like Coase, charge that the discipline lacks an interrogation of 
factor coordination in a complex interrelated structure, which is the whole 
economy (e.g. Eicher, 1999; Evensky, 2004; Hirschman, 1960). This criticism 
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has been articulated throughout the 20th century by economists from various 
sub-disciplines of economics. This is also illustrated in the historical debates in 
development economics between dependency and neoclassical economics 
theorists3 (e.g. Barro, 1990; Fei & Ranis, 1964; Hirschman, 1960; Lal, 1983; 
Myrdal 1957; and others). Within institutional economics the view that this 
debate was first articulated within what is now referred to as the old 
institutionalism, whose founding fathers include Thorstein Veblen (1904), 
Wesley Mitchell (1924) and John Commons (1924) is held by many (Coase, 
1998; Rutherford, 2001). In recent years what is called the new institutionalism 
(of which Coase, 1998; McCloskey, 1990; North, 1990; Rutherford, 2001; etc. are 
the greatest proponents) has again emerged. While the old school of 
institutionalists rejects the majority of classical economic theories, the new 
institutionalism seeks to retain what are perceived to be useful elements of 
neoclassical theories. This, for example, is apparent in the study of public 
institutions from a transactional cost framework by North (1990, 1991). Overall, 
institutionalism advocates the historical investigation of social and economic 
rules and the contributions of their transactional costs to development 
processes. An understanding of these rules and their interactions, 
institutionalists argue, would provide important economic explanations that 
formal economic theories are normally unable to offer especially in research 
(Williamson, 2000).  
 
Hence this paper illustrates the usefulness of a specific institutional 
understanding to providing economic meanings in a case where formal 
postulations could only partially explain the status quo from empirical data. 
T h e  c a s e  i s  o f  c i t r u s  i r r i g a t o r s  i n  the Kat River Basin in the Eastern Cape 
Province, and the formal postulations being tested come from the Physical 
Externality Model by Bromley (1982) with an application in Vatn and Bromley 
(1997).  
 
1.1  The  framework  proposal 
 
The model postulates that the mere physical location of farmers along a 
watercourse where water resources are diverted individually contributes to 
economic inefficiencies due to production input misallocations, ceteris paribus. 
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Along the system the downstream farmers are economically and politically 
worse off compared to their upstream counterparts.  
 
The production and other business environments within which downstream 
farmers operate are characterised by heightened uncertainties. In turn, 
downstream farmers produce a relatively lower level of output; they possess 
lower levels of economic and political power in local marketing and resource 
management institutions. However, the evidence of commercial citrus farmers 
located along the Kat River Valley (KRV) does not fully support the 
conclusions of the model. Hence, this case provides an opportunity to 
illustrate the usefulness of investigating institutions for good explanations of 
deviant evidence. In the discussion, the topical areas used to describe the 
differential empowerment levels of upstream versus downstream citrus 
irrigators are the following: 
a)  Water resources allocations and use 
b)  Land resources allocations and use 
c)  Citrus production output patterns  
 
The paper argues that upstream farmers in the KRV are only partially more 
empowered compared to their downstream counterparts. Such is the case even 
though they are located at supposedly more advantageous upstream positions 
along a watercourse (Bromley, 1982). It is shown that their relative economic 
disadvantage stems from entrenched institutions of the 20th century. These are 
formal and informal rules, practices and policies of external and internal 
origin. An understanding of these institutions and their effects provides the 
most useful supplementary explanations to empirical data, which deviates 
from the postulations of the Physical Externality model. 
  
The paper is structured in the following manner. Section 2 presents the 
Physical Externality Model and its postulations formally. Section 3 outlines the 
research methods. Section 4 presents data to describe patterns of physical 
settlements, citrus production, water and land resource use and the water 
management processes in the valley. Section 5 discusses the supplementary 
institutional explanations of the KRV status quo, while Section 6 summarises 
and concludes.  
 
 2.   The physical externality model 
 
Put simply, the model proposes that geographical location of farm units along a 
watercourse in which water is diverted individually gives rise to technical 
inefficiencies that adversely affect production outputs of downstream farmers 






(Bromley, 1982; Vatn & Bromley, 1997). Evidence from countries like Mexico 
and some in North Africa also indicate that upstream farm units tend to be 
bigger in size and their owners tend to possess a relatively strong political 
influence on decision making institutions governing water allocations and 
market prices of agricultural outputs.  
 
The inefficiencies in a given production cycle arise because of production 
decision uncertainties regarding how much water would be available to all 
farmers. The uncertainties are, however, more pronounced for downstream 
farmers. An illustration of a prototypical watercourse in which uncertainties 
intensify as one moves from the most upstream (A) to the most downstream 
(B) location is presented in Figure 1.  
 
I n  F i g u r e  1 ,  f a r m e r  B  i s  b o t h  e c o n omically and politically disadvantaged 
compared to A. His/her decisions with respect to production inputs, 
especially water resources, are also dependent on how much water is 
abstracted by A, which then determines the leftover quantities for abstraction. 
Equally important is that both farmers base their estimates of production 
inputs for the current cycle on the levels which were available in the previous 
cycle. In this manner the decision making process is strongly reliant on 
historical events4. Furthermore, it is assumed that all farmers are naturally risk 
averse. Therefore, given these factors, the model postulates that A’s and B’s 
estimates and final allocations of production inputs for the current cycle 
would be significantly conservative and sub-optimal. But because B is also 
dependent on A’s decisions and actions with respect to water, his/her final 
water resource allocation is even more inefficient. This in the end economically 
disadvantages B relative to A. Evidence from previous case studies (Bromley, 
1982; Vatn & Bromley, 1997) also shows that this economic disadvantage 
further translates into a political disadvantage.  
 
                                                 







Figure 1:   A watercourse with individual water abstractions  
 
Using the conventional Edgeworth box, Figure 2 illustrates these relative 
allocative inefficiencies and power disparities. In an economy of two farmers, 
two inputs and two levels of output, the horizontal axes represent the amount 
of finite water resources shared between farmers A and B, and the vertical 
axes the finite amounts of other inputs (lumped together) shared between the 
s a m e  f a r m e r s .  T h e  p o t e n t i a l  p r o d u c t i o n  o u t p u t  l e v e l s  f o r  e a c h  f a r m e r  a r e  



















Figure 2:  Inefficient  resource allocations in agricultural production 
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All efficient points (or levels) of production for the two farmers would form 
the contract line inside the box. But because of all the inefficient decision 
making factors, for example the physical location, uncertainty, and risk 
averseness, farmers in the system produce outside the contract line. In this 
case farmers A and B produce at points K and J respectively. At K, farmer A 
uses more of both inputs and his output level is higher than B’s, resulting in 
relative economic and political dominance over B. In other words the model 
highlights the negative economic effects of asymmetric information on both 
farmers, but more so on downstream farmers.  
 
In the following section the research methods used in collecting and analysing 
data from citrus irrigators in the valley are described. The data will be used to 
explore the usefulness (or lack thereof) and (in)accuracy of the PE model 
propositions in Section 4.  
 
3.  The research methods  
 
Case study and theme mapping methods were used in collecting and 
analysing data (see Oosthuizen et al., 2005; Williamson, 2000). Meetings of the 
KRV’s Water Users’ Association (WUA) were attended during 2004 to 2005. 
Semi-formal and formal interviews were conducted with farmers from 
different sections of the KRV. Large farms and irrigation schemes were visited 
frequently over three years between 2004 and 2007 to observe and document 
water resource abstraction methods from the Kat River and to understand 
how water was used and stored on farm reservoirs. Since 2004 a number of 
water policy workshops organised for large and small-scale water users were 
attended (and some facilitated) for gathering of data on irrigation water 
management politics. Formal interviews with officials from the regional 
Departments of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), Land Affairs (DLA) and 
Agriculture (DoA) were conducted between 2004 and 2006. Secondary data 
from archival documents of the former Republic of Ciskei, KRV WUA, DWAF, 
DLA, etc., were consulted to gather historical data to understand the 
application and effects of local formal and informal rules as well as the 
implementation of national and regional official policies. During interviews 
official and farmer respondents were allowed to recount their versions of 
historical events related to water use. These were recorded for analysis. Data 
from scientific reports, e.g. the technical Kat Dam Operating Rules (KDOR, 
1989) and Water Quality Research documents (e.g. Lerotholi, 2005) were used 
to gather quantitative data.  
 
The analysis of the data explored the resource allocations, production patterns, 






farmers located at upstream versus downstream positions. The data collected 
was also used to describe the general and specific economy and politics of the 
valley, which are presented in the following section.  
 
4.  The Kat River Valley  
 
The Kat River Valley is located in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa. 
With a number of tributaries feeding into the Kat River, the valley has three 
main sub-catchments and historical settlement areas, which are illustrated in 
Map 1. These are the Upper, Middle and Lower Kat. Black and coloured 
subsistence farmers populate the Upper Kat, and the Middle and Lower 
reaches are mostly occupied by white commercial citrus farmers. The Kat Dam 
is located near the town of Seymour (North-East location). Fort Beaufort is the 
main town in the valley and is located in the Middle Kat reach (centre of map). 
The Kat River runs from the dam through the town of Fort Beaufort to south 
of the valley.  
 
The current patterns of human settlement and resource distribution in the 
valley can be traced back to the 19th century frontier wars between the Xhosa 
versus Coloured people and British settlers. In 1829, the British army forced 
the Xhosa Chief Maqoma and his subjects out of the valley. Thereafter some 
parts of the area were designated for coloured settlement to form buffer zones 
between British settlers and Xhosa natives (Nel, 1998). In the late 19th century, 
citrus producing white farmers settled on the upper to lower reaches of the 
valley, roughly between the towns of Seymour and Fort Beaufort (Motteux, 
2002:52-62).  







Map 1:   The Kat River and its tributaries (alternative sources of water) 
 
The enactment of the Natives Land Act (27) (1913) and the Bantu Homelands 
Citizenship Act (26) (1970) formalised and cemented the racially segregated 
settlements as depicted on the map. When parts of the Eastern Cape’s 
Stockenstrom region in the Upper KRV were transferred to the former Ciskei 
(established in 1971) some of the citrus producing white and coloured-owned 
farms were expropriated for consolidation into the homeland by the South 
African Development Trust (SADT) (DLA, 1998:1). 
 
An investigation of the three main KRV farming communities revealed that 
separate formal and informal rules as well as cultural practices governed 






well as types of business transaction activities. The historical and current 
formal rules for each group were mostly in written form, e.g. in terms of 
public water policies, business constitutions, rules for the Kat Dam’s technical 
operations, etc. Informal and non-written rules were also followed by all 
groups but were especially enforced in the Upper Kat. Many of these 
management rules and practices alongside their developmental implications 
are discussed within the Physical Externality framework. To ensure that a 
similar group of farmers (located at different positions along the watercourse) is 
compared for the analysis, the discussion deliberately pays more attention to 
commercial citrus farmers located in the Middle and Lower reaches. The focus 
on black subsistence farmers, who form a very different social system located 
in the Upper Kat (previously part of the former Ciskei) is very important but 
deserves a separate discussion. The different character of the Upper Kat is best 
illustrated by land ownership disparities found in the valley. While the upper 
reaches were occupied by communal farming schemes with insecure access to 
collective land areas of around 30 hectares, some Middle and Lower Kat 
farmers owned or leased farm land areas in excess of 400 hectares and all with 
secure land tenure rights.  
 
4.1  A description of physical geography and land cultivation  
  
During the investigation period, large commercial farmers, small irrigation 
schemes and household users diverted and abstracted water directly from the 
Kat River system. The water resources flowed from the Kat dam - built in 1969 
- with a storage capacity of 24,892 x 10 m3 and an assured yield of 11.88 x 10 
m3 per annum (Motteux, 2002). This capacity extended water security to 
approximately 1600 hectares of scheduled5 land over a three year period 
(DLA, 1998; Painter, 2005). Other smaller streams, for example the Blinkwater 
(in the Middle Kat reach, Map 1), were also used as alternative water sources. 
 
Irrigated citrus cultivation requirements formed the largest share of abstracted 
water resources from the river system. Other irrigation uses were insignificant, 
especially by small Upper Kat farmers for staple vegetables like cabbages, 
potatoes, etc. Depending on the total amount of cultivated land (and) under 
irrigation on each farm or scheme, various amounts of water were abstracted. 
Table 1 presents these agricultural uses, by land area and position from the 
most recent and comprehensive study in the KRV (KDOR, 1989).  
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was given on the basis of land under cultivation. After the rights were conferred to a farmer, s/he was not 










































Total  666  359  37  51  14  1127 
Source: KDOR (1989) 
 
The reaches in the first column of the table refer to a sectional division of the 
valley by seven weirs, which are depicted in Appendix 1. As shown in Table 1, 
citrus cultivation was by far the dominant agricultural activity, with over 60% 
of total share in 1989. Tobacco was the second biggest crop at over 30%. 
During the field visits between 2004 and 2007, citrus cultivation had remained 
the biggest agricultural activity, especially in the Middle and Lower reaches, 
while tobacco was less extensively cultivated. In fact, some of the citrus farms, 
which were previously cultivated by White farmers in the Upper reaches, 
were no longer in operation. This also meant that about 764 hectares of 
scheduled land lay in waste (KRV WUA, 2004). In contrast, the Lower Kat 
reaches boasted additional land of around 884 hectares, which was cultivated 
for citrus without any water guarantees. In any case, Table 1 should be read as 
an indication of the kinds of potential cultivation suitable for the KRV and 
their historical extent. The 2005 land cultivation patterns for citrus production 
are illustrated in Table 2.  
 
Table 2:   Estimated land areas under citrus cultivation with and without 



























1600  918  682 1560* 884  764 
Note: The information from various sources (e.g. technical government documents, land register, 
KRV WUA reports) used in collating the estimated land sizes was not a 100% consistent*, hence 
the table is only indicative of the magnitudes of types of land used for citrus cultivation with 
different legal rights. 
Adapted from DLA (1998) 
 
The total amount of land under citrus cultivation almost doubled from 666 
hectares in 1989 to 1142 hectares in 2005. Citrus cultivation without water 






at 682 hectares (DLA, 1998). The business and political implications of citrus 
cultivation without water security are discussed in the following section.  
 
4.2  Water and land allocation rules and conflicts  
 
Scheduling rights and implications  
 
The institutions that governed water resource allocations influenced water and 
land distribution, political representation and market access patterns. For 
example, citrus farmers in the Middle to Lower reaches had direct access and 
representation in the KRV Water User Association (WUA)6. These farmers also 
had access to the only big and privately run packing and marketing 
cooperatives in the valley, namely, Katco and Riverside SA Enterprises. Access 
to water management bodies and business support was absent for the Upper 
Kat farmers (KRV WUA, 2004). The conflicts over access to water resources 
and its quality, especially among the Middle and Lower Kat commercial 
farmers, were clearly illustrated in the WUA records of meetings between 2002 
and 2004 (DWAF, 2005). These conflicts mainly centred on the lack of access to 
good quality bulk water resources for Lower Kat farmers and limited potential 
for land developments in the Middle Kat. 
 
After the construction of the Kat Dam, citrus farmers were given the option of 
acquiring scheduling rights by the provincial Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry (DWAF). These water access rights were meant to be the 
department’s way of ensuring water security to irrigators and Fort Beaufort 
townspeople. However, farmers who opted for water rights would be 
restricted from developing further land for citrus cultivation (e.g. Riverside 
farmers). Those without water rights would face no restrictions with respect to 
the amount of land set aside for citrus cultivation (Mbatha, 2005; Painter, 
2005). While many of the Middle Kat farmers opted for the scheduling, the 
majority of Lower Kat farmers did not. Due to the geographical nature of the 
watercourse, some Lower Kat farmers had little choice but not to be 
scheduled, simply because a farmer who had an upstream neighbour that was 
not scheduled could not him/herself sensibly choose to be scheduled, since 
most of his/her water share would be available for illegal abstraction by 
unscheduled upstream farmers. Hence, during interviews some Lower KRV 
farmers claimed that they were unfairly treated by the system. Nevertheless, 
that did not stop them from cultivating land without any legal water security 
in excess of 800 hectares (refer Table 2). Scheduled farmers in the Middle Kat 
also pointed out the irony that even with the claims of water vulnerability the 
Lower Kat farmers had expanded land under trees, which allowed them a big 
                                                 






competitive advantage (Mbatha, 2006). These technical and structural 
dynamics were a major source of documented water conflicts among 
commercial farmers in the KRV. The formal scheduling rules provided farmers 
in the Middle Kat with water security and decision making powers around 
water allocation and management, but the same rules provided the Lower Kat 
farmers with de facto opportunities for unrestricted land development to 
produce citrus.  
 
The flows and storage of water resources 
 
The dam’s operational rules, laid out in 1979, nonetheless affected the whole 
valley, including the Upper Kat subsistence farmers. The DWAF, in 
collaboration with members of the then Kat River Irrigation Board, laid down 
the rules for allocating water releases to scheduled and unscheduled irrigators 
(De Villiers, 2005; Painter, 2005). Some of the rules and requirements to meet 
the full annual irrigation needs for the basin are summarised in Table 3.  
 
Table 3:   Monthly water releases (Mm3) from Kat Dam required to meet 
full irrigation and domestic requirements  
Water releases per month  
Oct  Nov  Dec  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Year’s 
total 
0.73 0.92 1.81 2.52 1.50 0.91 0.78 0.64 0.54 0.49 0.57 0.61  12.06 
Other components contributing to total annual flows 
Irrigation water requirement 
Domestic water requirement 
River losses 





Source: KDOR (1989:14) 
 
The table illustrates that while 10.4 Mm³ were needed to meet the valley’s 
annual scheduling requirements, 12.06 Mm³ were released. This indicates an 
annual excess of less than 2 Mm³ to irrigation requirements of unscheduled 
growers, while more than 4 Mm³ were losses. Nevertheless higher water 
quantities were released in the early parts of the year, i.e. in January and 
February. Because citrus harvesting usually takes place between the months of 
June and August, it is sensible that the lowest releases occurred during that 
time of the year. However, the releases were kept close to meeting only the 
requirements of scheduled growers. This conservative water release practice is 
also supported by readings years later as presented in Figure 3.  




















Figure  3:    Kat River Dam water readings 2002 to 2005 (Source: DWAF, 
2005) 
 
Between 2002 and 2004 the  d a m ’ s  w a t e r  l e v e l s  w e r e  k e p t  a t  c l o s e  t o  f u l l  
capacity and way above the minimum levels of 60% (the dotted line), which 
are specified in official rules. The observations reiterate the conclusion made 
about the extent of decision making power that the Middle Kat farmers (who 
also managed the releases) had over the Lower Kat farmers. They kept water 
levels in the dam way above minimum requirements, which led to a 
documented stream of complaints during WUA meetings from the Lower Kat 
farmers. The farmers complained about the low quantity and poor quality of 
water available from the Kat River. But in response the Middle Kat farmers 
always mentioned the unrestricted expansion in land cultivation taking place 
in the Lower Kat as a disadvantage to them.  
 
The relative sizes of the farms in the Middle and Lower Kat reaches, with and 
without water scheduling, above and below the town of Fort Beaufort as well 
as water extraction pumps, boreholes and reservoirs are presented for each 
identified farm in Table 4.  






Table 4:   Farm ownership and associated water scheduling  












A Middle  Kat  4  337  285.7  8  n/a 
B Middle  Kat    61  50  1  n/a 
C Middle  Kat  3  5  30  1  4 
D Middle  Kat  N/a  24.5  21  n/a n/a 
E  Middle Kat  1  N/a  15 and 19  1  2 
F Middle  Kat    11.5  20  0  n/a 
G Middle  Kat  2  N/a  0  0  2 
Total    10  439  442  11  8 
H Lower  Kat  3  0  111  2  1 
I Lower  Kat  N/a  0  0  n/a  n/a 
J Lower  Kat  N/a  0  66  2 n/a 
K Lower  Kat  N/a  0  63 n/a  n/a 
L  Lower Kat  3  0  36  2  1 of 3 is 
used 
Total    3  0  276  6  4 
Source: KRV WUA (2004) 
 
It is clear from the table that while scheduled farmers faced lower risks with 
regard to water security, the Lower Kat farmers had actively taken the 
potential risk of investing in developing land for citrus production (e.g. the H 
enterprise). From these developments it could be fairly concluded that the 
Lower Kat farmers may not have faced a high enough level of water risks, 
which warranted their continuous stream of complaints at WUA meetings. 
Firstly, the scheduling dynamics offered them an unrestricted land 
development opportunity. Secondly, to actually develop more land for citrus 
irrigation they had to have relied on alternative sources of water. These would 
include secondary water streams, indicated in Map 1, boreholes and other 
sources, which are indicated in Table 4. The irrigation equipment audit of 
weirs, pumps and reservoirs in the table further confirms the availability of 
other water sources throughout the valley, including the Lower Kat reaches. In 
any case, a number of downstream farmers conceded that enough water 
sources were available to them, especially rainwater resources which were 
harvested for storage into private reservoirs.  
 
The foregoing discussion of data in Tables 2, 3 and 4 highlight the following 
points: 
 
a)  The Middle Kat farmers were protected from water risks for their citrus 
production; 
b)  Not only were their citrus cultivations under legal water guarantees 
from the Kat Dam, but from the sample in Table 4 they also had a higher 






c)  However, these farmers also faced land development restrictions from 
their water security; 
d) Table 3, alongside Figure 3, indicates that the Middle Kat farmers held 
the decision making powers with respect to the dam’s operations, which 
they used to further protect themselves against downstream farmers by 
allowing only very conservative water releases from the dam; but 
e)  Unconstrained to develop land by the water scheduling rights, to which 
they were not party, the Lower Kat farmers cultivated relatively more 
land (around 23% more than the Middle Kat farmers), which they were 
able to do without strong guarantees of water from the Kat Dam, but 
with water available from alternative sources.  
 
Regarding citrus cultivation, the performance of the Lower Kat farmers within 
the Physical Externality framework appears to be extraordinary. In most parts 
it contradicts the core propositions of the model. From the propositions we 
would expect to see the Middle Kat farmers, who are geographically located 
upstream of the valley’s primary watercourse and also endowed with 
exclusive water rights, to be more efficient, bigger and more successful 
economically and politically. The KRV study, however, has shown that there 
can be important institutional factors that may lead to unexpected outcomes. 
In the valley, these allowed, if not encouraged, the Lower Kat farmers to 
prosper to a level equivalent to or even higher than that of their upstream 
counterparts. These institutional factors, their implication for the application 
of the Physical Externality and other similar models, including implications 
for general economic inquiry are discussed in the following sections. 
 
5.   The institutional and research implications  
 
The water scheduling rights in the valley are classifiable as formal intangible 
institutions. These institutions enabled other formal and informal institutions 
to influence, with additional implications, the allocation of resources.7 While 
the rights provided the Middle Kat farmers with water security and decision 
making powers for the dam’s operations, the same rights limited the land use 
opportunities of these farmers. Ultimately, the economic advantage of holding 
scheduling rights proved to be rather limited when compared to their 
production costs for this group in the long run.  
 
Secondary informal rules which formed from scheduling rights included the 
responsibility given to Middle Kat farmers to make decisions about the water 
                                                 
7 Many institutionalists would perceive this development as conforming to what they call ‘path dependency’, a 
self supporting and rejuvenating attribute of dominant institutions, which makes it hard for institutions to be 






releases from the dam. This informal decision making institution offered these 
farmers a comparative power advantage, which they used effectively over 
their downstream counterparts. The practice of conservative water releases 
further disadvantaged the Lower Kat farmers with respect to water quantity 
and quality abstracted from the Kat River.  
 
On the other hand, however, in addition to being unrestricted to develop more 
land for citrus, there were alternative sources of water available to the Lower 
Kat farmers. Hence, the limitations on land development imposed on Middle 
Kat farmers by scheduling rights plus the availability of alternative water 
sources for the Lower Kat farmers collectively created a resultant status quo 
that simply defied what are sensible postulations of the Physical Externality 
model. This particular case highlights: 
 
a)  The potential and important real life limitations of research applications 
of any formal model in a ‘conceptual straightjacket’ manner (Demsetz, 
1969, cited in Rutherford, 2001:186), and 
b)  The ways in which an understanding of other factors, including key 
institutional developments could provide crucial explanations of the 
status quo, which in this case was presented by the interplay of formal 
scheduling rules and informal decision making powers with respect to 
water and land allocation and availability in the valley.  
 
Among other propositions of the PE model were the high levels of 
endogenous production externalities intrinsic to the system. These were 
predicted with a fair amount of accuracy. The Middle Kat farmers’ 
conservative water releases added to the high levels of inefficiencies. Although 
debatable, among other factors the practice was informally due to selfish 
strategic decisions of the Middle Kat farmers, but formally acceptable were the 
effects of memories of droughts of previous years.8 Moreover, it is clear that 
the high level of inefficiencies found in the Middle Kat not only affected the 
use and management of water resources, but were also made worse by formal 
restrictions over land cultivation. This was an institutional factor stemming 
from the prerequisites of scheduling rights and was external to the PE model’s 
initial specifications. It is then fair to conclude that the level and extent of 
inefficiencies, which were experienced in the Middle Kat, were a lot higher 
than those which could be predicted within all given parameters of the model.  
 
                                                 
8 Prior to 1983, the Kat River Dam’s water levels were less restrictive and not as regularly monitored, hence 
during the reported drought periods the dam’s capacity easily dropped to an alarming 5% (Mildenhall, 2004). 






The inefficiencies stemming from the practices in the Middle Kat were also 
transferred to the Lower Kat. Not only did the Lower Kat farmers complain 
about the low water flows in the Kat River, but also the quality. Here the PE 
model was most accurate in its predictions. However, these inefficiencies - in 
isolation - were not enough to disempower the Lower Kat farmers relative to 
their upstream counterparts. Instead, the downstream freer access to land for 
citrus development allowed the Lower Kat farmers to develop more land than 
upstream farmers while using alternative water resources more efficiently. 
This availability of alternative water sources was also external to the model’s 
specification. Hence, given the specific geographical factors of the system, 
institutional and production factors, downstream farmers were ultimately 
better off in relation to those located upstream. Such could not have been 
predicted using only the PE model as the framework for the research. 
 
5.1   Implications for general economic research  
 
Without a doubt the Physical Externality model is useful as an initial 
framework for interrogating the KRV system. It provides a good explanation 
of water resource allocation from the Kat River and use patterns among the 
Middle and Lower Kat farmers. But as illustrated by the case study, it fares 
poorly in providing the most important explanations of land use for citrus 
production patterns in terms of Middle versus Lower Kat farmer groups. 
Ultimately, it does not explain how downstream farmers possessed an 
economic advantage over their upstream counterparts in terms of land use 
and extent of citrus cultivation. These crucial advantages are better explained 
by context specific institutional and geographical factors, which are outside 
the model’s specifications.  
 
In that regard the KRV study makes a useful empirical case that a tool box of 
economic models is not always sufficient in providing meaningful answers to 
economic investigations. The study provides an illustrative light on Coase’s 
(1998) charge that economics has, without the study of institutions, become an 
investigation of blood circulation without a body. The KRV study illustrates 
why an interrogation of institutional and other factors and their coordination 
are key to understanding and explanation of complex interrelated structures, 
like economic systems. A word of caution for economic research undertakings 
from this discussion would be, firstly, to discard any belief that economic 
models can provide enough or even suitable tools for explaining socio-
economic systems, secondly, to always factor and investigate the effects, at 
least, of the most dominant institutions in their practice on the ground.  






6.   Summary, conclusion and recommendations for policy 
 
The old and new institutionalists have always proposed that general economic 
inquiry has to varying degrees in the last century neglected properly 
contextualised interrogations of formal and informal institutions. As pointed 
out by Coase (1998) and Rutherford (2001), among these types of economists 
were Thorstein Veblen (1904), Wesley Mitchell (1924), and John Commons 
(1924) in the early 20th century. Later on they included Hirschman (1960), 
McCloskey (1990), North (1990) and Williamson (2000), who argued primarily 
along the same lines against the blind use of what they have called economic 
tool boxes - embodied in formal economic models. The argument led to the 
purpose of this paper, which was to illustrate the usefulness of mapping out 
an understanding of institutional and other influences within a particular 
environment, where empirical observation has defied some predictions of 
what seems like a really sensible formal specification in the form of a Physical 
Externality model.  
 
The arguments from the KRV study are also specifically important for current 
economic research on social factors around South Africa’s water reallocation 
policies (National Water Act (NWA) (36), 1998). In similar river basins with 
respect to geography and history, the study illustrated why time should be 
devoted to investigating the historical effects of formal policies, local practices, 
allocation strategies, etc., to obtain understanding on the institutional mosaic 
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Appendix 1: KRV weirs and boundary river reaches: seven main water 







Source: KDOR (1989) 
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